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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: THIRD CIRCUIT REJECTS
FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE OF
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES EMBODIED IN AMENDED
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 19
THE Third Circuit has impugned the premise and frustrated the
goal. of the new Federal Rule 19 by holding that the indispensable
party doctrine is substantive law and therefore unaffected by a rule
of procedure.' Following a fatal automobile accident, the executor
of a deceased passenger brought a declaratory judgment action to
establish the liability of the insurer, which had denied that the policy
covered the person driving the car at the time of the accident. The
insurer joined the estate of another victim and a surviving passenger
but did not join the insured owner. The determinative factual issue
was whether the driver was acting within the scope of the owner's
permission at the time of the accident. At the trial on the merits,
the. district court judge found that because the policy was for a
stated sum, any amount recovered by the estates would reduce the
funds available to the insured on any claim arising from the accident.
Thus, since the interests of the estates and the insured were adverse,
the court invoked Pennsylvania's Dead Man's Act2 to prevent the in-
sured from testifying as to the driver's permission in the suits brought
by the estates. However, the owner was allowed to testify against
the surviving passenger, who did not come under the act's restrictions.
The jury found that the driver was within the scope of the owner's
permission and rendered a verdict for the injured party. Similarly,
the district court directed verdicts for the plaintiff estates,3 whereupon
the insurer, protesting the application of the dead man's statute and
the. propriety of the directed verdicts, appealed. The court of ap-
peals, however, did not reach these questions since it sua sponte
determined the insured owner to be an indispensable party, thus
necessitating dismissal of the action. 4
Indispensable parties have been defined as
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d
802 (3d Cir. 1966).
* PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
8 Provident Trades~iens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 218 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
'365 F.2d at 804, 816.
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Persons who.., have [such] an interest in the controversy... that
a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest,
or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termi-
nation may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science.5
Thus, in an action to quiet title, the disposessed claimant must join
the adverse claimant. 6 Similarly, joint obligees must be joined when
one of them is suing an obligor.7 However, where the absent parties
have separable interests, such as those of joint tort-feasorss or joint
obligors,9 they are not usually termed indispensable. Yet when a
party is found to be indispensable, the court will dismiss the action °
on the theory that "no court can adjudicate directly upon a person's
right without the party being ... before the court."'" Such a pro-
cedure, however, conflicts with those policies which favor "economy
and effectiveness in litigation" and the assurance of a remedy for the
plaintiff. 12 The extent to which a court will balance the absent
party's interest with these latter considerations depends essentially
upon whether the court considers the indispensability doctrine to be
a substantive right or a procedural guide. If the doctrine is sub-
stantive, the court's consideration of the problem must end with a
technical determination of the absent party's interest; on the other
hand, if it is procedural, the court can determine in the light of
equitable and pragmatic considerations whether or not it should
proceed.' 3 The correct choice between these alternatives is a matter
'Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854). See generally JAMES, CxVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 9.14-.27 (1965); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 19 (2d ed. 1964); WRIGHT,
FEDERAL Couris § 70, at 260 (1963); Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed
Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965); Hazard, Indispensable Party:
The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. Rv. 1254 (1961); Reed,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1957).
'E.g., Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
882 U.S. 985 (1966); Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936).
7E.g., Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S. 579 (1890); Bry-man's, Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d 585
(5th Cir. 1963); see MOORE, op. cit. supra note 5, 19.11.
8 E.g., McRanie v. Palmer, 2 F.R.D. 479 (D. Mass. 1942); see 3 MoORE, op. cit. supra
note 5, 19.07, at 2153 and cases cited n.13.
9E.g., Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Langhorn, 146 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1945); see 3 MooRE,
op. cit. supra note 5, 19.11.
1 0 E.g., Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936); see 3 MOORE, op.
cit. supra note 5, 19.06, at 2152. See generally Comment, 29 CAIF. L. REv. 731
(1941).
21 Mallow v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193, 198 (1827); see Reed, supra note 5, at
331-32.
12 JAMES, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 9.17-.19.
18 Compare Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 428 (9th Cir. 1936), with
Mallow v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193, 197-98 (1827).
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of current dispute, which has its roots in the historical development
of the doctrine.
The indispensability rule arose in equity where the court, in order
to dispose of all contested issues, required that every person having
an interest in the action be present.14 In the earliest enunciations
of the rule in this country, the determination of indispensability was
commonly held to be subject to the judge's discretion.'5 However,
after Shields v. Barrow6 in 1854, there was a noticeable shift in
the application of the doctrine. Holding the absent party to be
indispensable, the Court in Shields emphasized his technically
inseparable interest in the subject matter of the suit. 7 This
concentration upon a technical jointness' 8 tended to formularize
the doctrine.' 9 Concomitantly, the'courts began to repeat more fre-
quently earlier dicta to the effect that indispensability was a matter
of substantive law which circumscribed judicial power to hear a
case.20  Even in these enunciations, however, there has been con-
fusion as to the underlying basis of this "substantive law." Some
courts have held that the failure to join an indispensable party was
a jurisdictional defect; 21 others have suggested that the failure could
constitute a denial of due process to the absent party; 22 and a few
have merely stated without explanation that to proceed without an
indispensable party is "fatal error."23 Yet even as this trend toward
a substantive view of the rule developed,24 there remained a counter-
1" See Fink, supra note 5, at 403; Hazard, supra note 5, at 1255-56; Reed, supra
note 5, at 331, 347; Comment, Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv.
L. REV. 874, 879 (1958); cf. LouIsELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 694-95 (1962).
11 Mallow v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193, 197 (1827); Elmendorf v. Taylor,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166-67 (1825); West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718, 721-23 (No.
17424) (C.CR.I. 1820).
"6 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
27 Id. at 140.
18 See Advisory Committee's Note, FEn. R. Civ. P. 19, reported in 86 Sup. Ct. (No.
11) 22 (1966).
29 See JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 9.21; WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 5, § 70, at 260-
61; Reed, supra note 5, at 340-46. But see Fink, supra note 5, at 418-16.
20See, e.g., Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 U.S. 152 (1924); Washington
v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936); United States v. Fried, 183 F. Supp. 371
(E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 309 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1962).
21E.g., Caldwell Mfg. Co. v. Unique Balance Co., 18 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc., 406 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1966) (dictum); see Fink,
supra note 5, at 416-17 n.53; Reed, supra note 5, at 348 nn.69-70.
2 E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). See generally
LouIsEm. & HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 429-30; Fink, supra note 5, at 421.
23E.g., Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 428 (9th Cir. 1936).
"See Fink, supra note 5, at 410-11. See generally Advisory Committee's Note, supra
note 18, at 22-23.
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vailing influence which, while not as widespread, has seemed to view
the rule as one of procedure. 5 One reason for this latter tendency
has been the nature of the strict federal diversity requirements, which
have encouraged particular courts to "strain" to render some form of
relief to those before them, either by finding the absent party to be
only necessary or by shaping the final decree so as to protect his
interest.28 Accordingly, two courts, faced with the prospect of an
inequitable dismissal, have proceeded to judgment in the knowl-
edgable absence of a clearly "indispensable" party.27 Consequently,
it is difficult to discern from the cases any definitive answer to the
question of whether the rule is substantive or procedural. 28  At least
one commentator has suggested that the courts have employed these
terms as labels to denote conclusions reached after an unannounced
weighing of equitable considerations. 29 The commentators are not,
however, in agreement, although the greater number of recent
articles seems to favor the procedural view.30
Nevertheless, in formulating the new Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 19, the Advisory Committee clearly adopted the procedural
view of the indispensable party doctrine. The old rule, entitled
"Necessary Joinder of Parties," was essentially a restatement of the
contemporary understanding of indispensability and did not question
the nature of the doctrine.81 Thus, rule 19 (a) stated simply that
"persons having a joint interest shall be made parties, '32 and rule
12 (b) provided for dismissal of an action for failure to join an in-
dispensable party.33 As a result of the wording of those rules, the link
between a party's technical interest and his indispensability became
21 E.g., Gauss v. Kirk, 198 F.2d 83, 85 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Parker Rust-Proof Co.
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1939).
26E.g., Kroese v. General Steel Casings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 764-65 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950). See generally Reed, supra note 5, at 351-54; Committee
Comment, MicH. Gr. R. ANN. 205 (1963).
27 Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1939);
Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co.; 24 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
21 E.g., Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.7 (1st Cir. 1964); Gauss v. Kirk, 198
F.2d 83, 85 n2 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
20 WRIGrT, op. cit. supra note 5, § 70, at 263.
80JAMEs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 9.20, at 425; Hazard, supra note 5, at 1255; Reed,
supra note 5, at 436. Contra, Fink, supra note 5, at 448.
8'1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 1 F.R.D. xci (1941). See Fink, supra note 5, at 408-11; Com-
ment, 71 HAnv. L. REV. 874, 879 (1958); Note, 56 YAI.E L.J. 1088 (1947). But see Fink,
supra note 5, at 411-12 n.34.
3" Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 1 F.R.D. xci (1941).
83 FED. R. CAv. P. 12 (b) (7). See FED. R. Cav. P. 12 (h).
Vol. 1967: 208]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
even stronger,84 for the bare command of the rules was not con-
ducive to judicial analysis of the character of the doctrine. The
basic change attempted by the Committee in the new rule is clearly
indicated by the title: "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudica-
tion." In the revised rule 19 the emphasis is shifted from the party's
technical interest to whether "in the light of pragmatic considera-
tions"3 5 the court should proceed with the parties before it or dismiss
the action. The word indispensable is thus used only in a "con-
clusory" sense.36 "Equity and good conscience" are the goals, and
new functional guides have replaced the technical criteria of the old
rule;37 the courts are specifically instructed to consider the following
inclusive factors:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.88
Thus the new rule's emphasis upon the pragmatic considerations of
the original equity concept of indispensability39 indicates its flexible,
procedural orientation 4 0
The majority of the Third Circuit, however, rejected this position.
Finding a joint interest between the insured and the insurer which
might be adversely affected by the final decree, the majority reasoned
that the insured owner was an indispensable party.41 Consequently,
the court, basing its decision primarily on' those cases which have
stated that the indispensability rule is substantive, concluded that
P"Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 18, at 22; see Fink, supra note 5, at 408-
11; cf. Reed, supra note 5, at 355-56.
sAdvisory Committee's Note, supra note 18, at 24; accord, Gram v. May, 41 F.R.D.
52 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
8"Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 18, at 25.
87 Compare Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1936), with
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 18, at 24-25.
I' FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (b). See LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R. S. Noonan, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 4
(M.D. Pa. 1966); B. L. Schrader, Inc. v. Anderson Lumber Co., 257 F. Supp. 794 ().
Md. 1966); Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 18, at 24-25.
"Id. at 22.
"0 Compare Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 34 F.RD. 371, 379
(1964) and Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.7 (Ist Cir. 1964), with Advisory
Committee's Note, supra note 18.
"1365 F.2d at 809.
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it must dismiss since the rule restricted its power to adjudicate the
matter.42 Furthermore, the court reasoned that rule 19 is merely
procedural and therefore could not affect this. substantive law. The
dissent, on the other hand, rejected the majority's conclusions as
historically ill-founded and relied instead on recent writings, the
Advisory Committee's Note, and those cases which have treated in-
dispensability as a procedural issue.4 3 The dissent argued that,
irrespective of whether the district court should have proceeded, the
jury verdict should be preserved by fashioning an effective decree
which would protect the absent party.44 Thus, the minority members
of the court were free to consider those factors which they felt were
equitably relevant. They stressed that it had been eight years since
the accident, that the insured had testified, and that he could have
tried to intervene if he had felt his interests were jeopardized by the
proceedings. 45 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the insured's
interest could have been protected by shaping the decree so that any
recovery on the policy by the estates or the injured party would have
been conditional upon prior satisfaction of any claims against the
insured.46 A comparison of both the reasoning and the result of these
two divergent approaches suggests the wisdom of the discretionary
application of the procedural view of the indispensability rule. The
flexibility of the minority's approach, when contrasted with the rigid
stance taken by the majority, is demonstrably preferable. Although
the majority may support its result by a perfunctory recitation of
rule 12 (b), it can proffer no equitable justification for dismissal in
the instant case. The dismissal is contrary not only to the modem
philosophy of procedure, which stresses equity and convenience, but
also to the historical basis of the indispensability doctrine, which
emphasizes its discretionary character. An ad hoc determination
of the absent party's interest according to the criteria of the new rule
19 is clearly superior to a ritualistic application of the joint interest
formula, which is blind to the equities of the case.
"Id. at 809, 813.
"Id. at 817-18, 821-22 (dissenting opinion); accord,'Rippey.Y. Denver U.S. Nat'l
Bank, 10 FED. RuLEs Sssv. 2d 19a.1-61, case 15 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 1966).
41365 F.2d at 820.
"Id. at 819-20.
46 Id. at 819.
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